You mention “assumptions that [I] make…in premise 14″. You ought to understand step 14 as a conclusion resting upon premises that precede it numerically.

You still affirm that “If God exists and has middle knowledge it is reasonable to think that each aborted baby would have died in infancy anyway.” Now I’m starting to see that in your attempts to explore the implications of molinism, you are reaching a bit beyond your own expertise. Consider the following two statements you make:

If you assume Molinism, you must also assume there is a God who holds all free-agents accountable for their actions towards the unborn.

This is neither here nor there. Nothing in my argument denies that God “holds all free-agents accountable for their actions towards the unborn.”

Second, just because it is reasonable to believe a possible world exists, does not make it reasonable to believe that that possible world is the actual world. The fact is you cannot know what possible world has been actualised by God.

I freely concede that there is a possible world in which every baby that is aborted in the actual world dies in infancy (in that possible world). This is precisely how you can understand my statement that it is logically possible that every aborted baby would have died in infancy anyways. However, what’s at stake is the issue of whether or not it is reasonable to believe that such a possible world is in fact also the actual world. Let me quote myself:

Just because something is logically possible doesn’t mean that it is reasonable to believe that it is true. Just because God might have ordered the world in a certain way doesn’t mean that it is reasonable to suppose that he in fact did.

I appreciate your questions and, during the discourse, will answer them.

Question 1: Since you believe it is reasonable to assume that each aborted baby would have died in infancy anyways, what would you say if people actually began assuming this? . . . Suppose that people begin comforting themselves with the idea that every baby that gets aborted would have otherwise died immediately after birth anyways. What would you say?

Question 2: If it is reasonable to assume that every single aborted baby would have otherwise [if it had not been aborted and reached adulthood] developed such beliefs and wishes [such as "I wish I had been aborted"], why can’t someone take comfort in such an assumption? (brackets mine)

During the duration of this discussion and the back and forth, you have been assuming the existence of heaven and hell to show “abortion is in the unborn baby’s interest” (premise 14). To avoid this conclusion I have assumed that God exists and has middle knowledge. I get the inkling that you are trying to spring a trap by arriving at a morally unacceptable consequence that comes as a logical result of the Molinist’s framework employed here. While I show that this strategy is erroneous, lets not forget that it is your argument has already led to unacceptable moral consequences – at least on the assumptions that you make about the nature of the foetus – in premise 14.

Firstly, your comment above ceases to make these vital assumptions about God. If God exists and has middle knowledge it is reasonable to think that “each aborted baby would have died in infancy anyway”, but if he does not exist it is not reasonable to think that. But if he does the same God, whose middle knowledge and power actualises the best possible way to achieve the best possible world, also judges it. If you assume Molinism, you must also assume there is a God who holds all free-agents accountable for their actions towards the unborn. So the trip mechanism on your trap cannot hold open the jaws of your argument.

Second, just because it is reasonable to believe a possible world exists, does not make it reasonable to believe that that possible world is the actual world. The fact is you cannot know what possible world has been actualised by God. So when it comes to destroying the life of a child before it is born, it is always best to err on the side of caution by preserving life, and not delude oneself into thinking up possible scenarios are actually the case.

Since you believe it is reasonable to assume that each aborted baby would have died in infancy anyways, what would you say if people actually began assuming this? (After all, your arguments are so rigorous.) Suppose that people begin comforting themselves with the idea that every baby that gets aborted would have otherwise died immediately after birth anyways. What would you say?

Alternatively, we could suppose that people began assuming that each baby that is aborted would have otherwise become a fierce advocate of abortion, wishing that he/she would have been aborted. If it is reasonable to assume that every single aborted baby would have otherwise developed such beliefs and wishes, why can’t someone take comfort in such an assumption?

Not sure I am following you here…

“I believe hell involves eternal destruction. I don’t believe it involves eternal concious suffering.”

What do you mean by “eternal destruction”? Do you mean something is destroyed once and then ceases to exist for eternity?

I’m afraid you have missed the point of the Molinistic spear. Given that God has resources sufficient to create a possible world, namely, knowledge to concieve of it and power to actualise it, if it is logically possible then all your suggestions are “not unreasoanble.”

I believe hell involves eternal destruction. I don’t believe it involves eternal concious suffering.

I suppose he might of – but I don’t really see your point. If you want your argument to succeed then why do you press your own premise toward refutation? I challenge 7. That challenge to 7 doesn’t dissipate if 6 falls as well.

The point is simply to help you to see that your objection to step 7 leads to some absurdities. That is, if you were consistent, the argument you use would lead you to insist that it is not unreasonable to think that every aborted baby would have died in infancy anyways. After all, to say that such a hypothesis is unreasonable is to “claim to know the mind of God.” By parity of reason, you must think that it is also not unreasonable to assume that, of the hundreds of millions of aborted fetuses, every single one of them would have become molinists advocating young earth creationism. And this is absurd. (If you cannot see that this is absurd, let me know and I’ll add more.)

Thank you for following the discussion. Step-by-step arguments are a good way to make explicit a chain of reasoning, so as to expose as much as possible to critical reflection. I have numbered the steps simply to facilitate reference. If you can see a “branch” that has been ignored, but ought not to be, I welcome your insight.